Dynamic capabilities and organizational inertia during digital transformation by Airikkala, Aleksi
 Aleksi Airikkala 
Dynamic capabilities and organizational inertia 









  Vaasa 2021 
School of Management 
Master's thesis in Strategic Business 
Development 
2 
UNIVERSITY OF VAASA 
School of Management  
Author:    Aleksi Airikkala 
Title of the Thesis:  Dynamic capabilities and organizational inertia during digital  
transformation 
Degree:    Master of Science in Economics and Business Administration 
Programme:   Master's Programme in Strategic Business Development 
Supervisor:   Tuomas Huikkola 
Year:    2021 Pages: 80 
ABSTRACT: 
Research on digital transformations is growing, and research streams regarding the subject are 
forming. One of those streams is organizational inertia and how it affects the new value creation 
processes enabled by digital transformation. While information technology increases the uncon-
trollable complexity in which firms operate, organizational inertia can be controlled. The pur-
pose of this study is through an empirical case to understand sources of organizational inertia, 
how it affects the success of digital transformation, and how the organizational inertia can be 
overcome. 
  
While the capability view is a dominant lens to research on why some firms succeed and others 
fail in the face of environmental change, the theoretical premise of this study extends that view 
to the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. To reflect the chosen approach for this study, 
the theoretical framework comprises employee-level adoption against organization-level trans-
formation. In addition to common microfoundations concepts, three types of organizational in-
ertia are defined to set the baseline for the empirical part of this study, and current definitions 
of digital transformation are discussed. 
  
The empirical part was carried out as a single case study. The chosen case was Keltainen Pörssi, 
a former publication and online media acquired by Sanoma Oy, which provided a fitting context 
to study organizational inertia due to its unsuccessful reponse to an industry-wide digital trans-
formation. The data were collected from two sources – semi-structured interviews and publicly 
available sources. Adapting the retrospective setting of interviews, the discussed teams cen-
tered around how the establishment of online media succeeded and what kind of tensions 
emerged. A content analysis was performed for the interview data, and a timeline was con-
structed based on the publicly available sources. 
  
The study's main findings consist of the recognized types of organizational inertia and their 
sources, what kind of effects they had on the digital transformation, and how some of the rec-
ognized types of inertia can be overcome. On top of structural, socio-technical, and cognitive 
inertia, identity, business model inertia, and a success trap were identified as sources of organ-
ization inertia. While the chosen framework for this case focused on employee-level adoption, 
that did not play a role in the observed transformation. On the other hand, the findings support 
a more relational approach to digital transformation, where the transformation is not always 
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Information technology has the potential to transform industries fundamentally through 
new products and services. However, the open question remains whether managers and 
organizations with long successful business models can make that change when con-
fronted with technological discontinuity (Lucas & Goh, 2009). Firms surviving and suc-
ceeding in the face of environmental changes when others fail is a common area of in-
terest for scholars and managers pursuing to understand organizational renewal (Dan-
neels, 2010). Danneels argues that changing the company's resource base is not always 
rational in the strive to survive, but resource alteration is is known to enable organiza-
tional renewal. This study answers which rigidities cause organizational inertia in the face 
of such transformation, how they affect the success of such transformation, and how the 
effects of inertia can be overcome. 
  
New technological innovations challenge firms to rethink their strategies, marketing, and 
innovation (Downes & Nunes, 2013). Additionally, being able to control fewer elements 
in their operating environment, organizations are more fragile in sustaining competitive 
advantage (Vial, 2019). This incorporates to the concept of dynamic capabilities, and 
how successful organizations are able create and recombine resources accordingly (Dan-
neels, 2010; Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). However, understanding on how organizational 
inertia moderates dynamic capability dimensions remains limited (cf. Schilke, Hu & 
Helfat, 2018). Vial (2019) describes that the inertia for incumbents emerges from their 
embeddedness, but this study's findings suggest combining effects of different types of 
inertia. In the case, the technological discontinuity described by Lucas et al. (2009) 
caused changes in value creation paths, and posed a challenge for the organization to 
capture that value due to organizational inertia. 
  
Where dynamic capabilities perspective remains as a popular approach to transforma-
tional studies (e.g. Danneels, 2010; Lucas et al., 2009) this study proceeds to extend that 
view to more individual-level considerations that have been black-boxed by the capabil-
ity view to some degree (Abell, Felin & Foss, 2008). This is carried out by establishing the 
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theoretical premise of this study on dynamic capability perspective and its microfounda-
tions (e.g. Abell et al., 2008; Eisenhardt, Furr, & Bingham, 2010; Eisenhardt et al., 2000; 
Felin, Foss, Heimeriks, & Madsen, 2012; Teece, 2007). Abell et al. (2008) argue that the 
boundary between microfoundations and capability view is often wavering in the litera-
ture and that the microfoundations literature is raising attention as explanators of firm-
level phenomena. They continue that connections from more dominant capabilities view 
to its microfoundations are virtually non-extant, and this study seeks to build that bridge. 
This is also supported by Schilke et al. (2018), who argue that understanding the dimen-
sions of dynamic capabilities, including their microfoundations, remains as a potential 
are of future investigation. 
 
1.1 Research gap 
Research on digital transformations remains at a turning point as concepts are unclear, 
and research streams are gradually being established (Vial, 2019.) For example, Verhoef 
et al. (2019) describe that digital transformation is the most pervasive concept compared 
to other definitions (digitization and digitalization) and concerns organization as a whole. 
Vial (2019) aligns, but suggests a more general definition where entities vary and are 
improved enabled by different technologies. Simultaneously, several markets have been 
impacted by digital transformation disruptions (Verhoef et al., 2019). This sets the po-
tential to study digital transformation from different points of view and contribute to 
existing research. Cennamo, Dagnino, Di Minin, and Lanzolla (2020) highlight that where 
the benefits of digital transformation are often acknowledged, the challenges of it need 
more clarification and have to be addressed. One of the central challenges is the two-
sided interaction of information technology: on one side, it serves the competitiveness 
of the firm, and on the other side, design, implementation, and use of such artifacts 
create rigidity and decrease strategic adaptability (Schmid, Rechker & vom Brocke, 2017). 
Emerging from this tension, Schmid et al. (2017) argue that inertia is a central concept 
to digital transformation but remains under-developed and under-operationalized. 
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Digital transformation is viewed as a strategic response to disruptions, often to new dig-
ital technologies, in industry and society levels (Verhoef et al., 2019; Vial, 2019). Fittingly, 
microfoundations offer an important dimension to study macro-management (Felin, 
Foss, Ployhart, 2015). By far, microfoundations have offered significant input to organi-
zation theory and strategic management (Felin et al., 2015). How digital transformation 
unfolds in practice should gain more attention to the organization's micro-level. (Vail, 
2019). For example, Warner and Wäger (2019) highlight how more research is needed 
on how microfoundations build dynamic capabilities for digital transformation. Addition-
ally, individuals as the source of organizational capability, behavioral foundations of or-
ganization and decision-making, and origins of collective actions offer research opportu-
nities in the micro discipline, which can then be extended to the macro domain (Felin et 
al., 2015). This study seeks to shed light on how the transformation connects to the mi-
cro-level phenomena. 
 
1.2 Objectives and research questions 
In uncertain environments or when firms engage in organizational transformation, or-
ganizational inertia can become dangerous (Rowe, Besson & Hemon, 2017). This study 
aims to discover how dynamic capabilities and their microfoundations contribute to the 
emergence of organizational inertia, how it affects digital transformation's success, and 
how firms should approach the organizational inertia in such situations. The scope is 
narrowed down to digital transformation, leaving out other definitions as digitalization, 
organizational transformation, and business model transformation. This highlights fun-
damental changes in the firm's core processes enabled by combinations of different 
technologies, which can result in organizational inertia. To understand better the dam-
aging outcomes of organizational inertia and how it can be overcome, following research 
questions are answered:  
  
1. What are the sources of organizational inertia? 
2. How organizational inertia affects the success of digital transformations? 
3. How to overcome organizational inertia in digital transformations? 
10 
1.3 Thesis structure 
This study consists of five chapters. The second chapter is the literature review, which 
builds the theoretical foundation on three areas of research. Since the definitions of dig-
ital transformation vary a lot, the chapter discusses the current state of digital transfor-
mation literature and presents the building blocks for digital transformation definitions. 
The chapter continues to establish the theoretical premise of this study on dynamic ca-
pabilities and its microfoundations. Furthermore, organizational inertia and three types 
of it are defined as a starting point to explore inertia empirically. The third chapter intro-
duces the methodological choices to carry out this case study. The fourth chapter pre-
sents the results based on two different datasets. This includes primary data (semi-struc-
tured interviews) and secondary data (publicly available information). The final chapter 
introduces the results cohesively against the research questions of this study, and signif-




Figure 1. Structure of the thesis. 
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2 Literature review 
Technological change is often challenging for established firms (Bower & Christensen, 
1995). Difficulties arise when new technology is deemed to challenge the essence of the 
firm and produces inertia from different sources. Existing research has acknowledged 
different types of inertia, but how managers should cope with it in large-scale techno-
logical change needs more light shed upon. (Tripsas, 2009.) As a result, the literature 
review of this study starts with understanding the concept of digital transformation, and 
proceeds then to build the bridge between individuals and dynamic capabilities.  Then, 
organizational inertia is conceptualized to set the starting point for empirical observation. 
 
2.1 Digital transformation 
These radical technological changes are proven to be deadly for established organiza-
tions on many occasions (Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000; Vuori & Huy, 2006). Tripsas et al. (2000) 
raise an example that when technological change harms the value of a firm's comple-
mentary assets, the firm is more inclined to fail. However, increased market turbulence 
has led organizations even from "latecomer" industries to evaluate digitization in search 
of cost control and flexibility, despite the often-high investments required (Kohli & John-
son, 2011). This chapter focuses mostly on strategic responses and changed value crea-
tion paths in addition to defining digital transformation presented in Vial's (2019) digital 




Figure 2. Digital transformation process (adapted from Vial, 2019). 
 
2.1.1 Conceptualization of digital transformation 
The following discussion on the definition of digital transformation will establish its 
structure based on Vial's (2019) comprehensive review of the current state of digital 
transformation studies. The review highlights four properties in the definitions of digital 
transformation (Table 1). Vial's (2019) work is significant as it contributes by extending 
current digital transformation studies' views on multiple levels and highlights how defi-
nitions of digital transformation fall short on many of them. 
 
Table 1. Properties of digital transformation's definition (Vial, 2019). 
 
Property Definition 
Target entity Organization, platform, ecosystem, industry, society. 
 
Scope  The transformation can be profound and has implications beyond the 
organization's immediate value network (e.g. society, customers). 
 
Means  Combinations of digital technologies (e.g. analytics and mobile apps). 
 
Expected outcome Business processes are transformed, and the business model of the 
focal organization is altered; in some instances business processes 
are optimized.  
 
  
To start with, digital transformation is not only an organization-centric concept, but plat-
forms, ecosystems, industries, and societies can also be deemed fit target entities for 
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transformational studies (Vial, 2019). Vial (2019) points out that this lack of conceptual-
ization can result from digital transformations association to business benefits. For ex-
ample, the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated how teaching platforms in the educa-
tion industry, public sector, and societies at large have undergone a drastic digital trans-
formation in a short time (Iivari, Sharma, & Ventä-Olkkonen, 2020). As a result, in their 
study of digital transformation in the Finnish taxi industry, Lanamäki, Väyrynen, Laari-
Salmela, and Kinnula (2020) introduce a new relational approach to digital transfor-
mation by suggesting that digital transformation is a faulty unit of measurement for de-
scribing transformation in every industry. Since digital transformation is not always in-
tentional, the organization-centric approach obstructs seeing the ambiguous reasons 
leading to a digital transformation (Lanamäki et al., 2020). 
 
The scope ranges across different studies on digital transformation, according to Vial 
(2019). Cennamo et al. (2020) came up with reinforcing results from their review on dig-
ital transformation research, pointing out that the scope ranges from intra-firm pro-
cesses and operations to industry-wide networks. Chanias et al. (2019) argue that scope 
can easily adjust as the benefits of new digital resources are discovered. Vial (2019) ad-
dresses this difficulty of defining the scope by noting that digital transformation's scope 
can be profound and expand outside of intra-firm networks with its implications. Simi-
larly, Lanamäki et al. (2020) raise the prospect that the target entity more extensive than 
a single organization would better explain industry-level changes influencing the above 
organizations. Therefore, the definition of Vial (2019) generalizes the scope as "signifi-
cant changes". 
 
In his review, Vial (2019) discovered that conceptual unclarities related to means and 
artifacts of digital transformation were widely shared across different studies. For exam-
ple, the artifacts of transformation ranged from "digital technologies", "digital capabili-
ties", and "digital shock" to more. In their qualitative study, Pramanik, Kirtania, and Pani 
(2019) found that many major US bank employees connected digital transformation to 
new technologies and were able to link new technologies to practical usage possibilities. 
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The difficultness of digital transformation artifact definition may indicate that digital 
transformation is a relational concept where the transformation actors can still build 
linkages between new technology and their practices as suggested by Lanamäki et al. 
(2020). Vial (2019) pursues to solve this ambiguity with his definition of digital transfor-
mation and replaces a category of technology as an artifact with a broader concept of 
"combinations of information, computing, communication, and connectivity technolo-
gies".  
 
As remarked above, current studies easily link digital transformation with different busi-
ness benefits due to the studies' organization-centric approach. Chanias, Myers, and 
Hess (2019) conclude that digital transformation strategy is always developing, which 
impedes predicting digital transformation outcomes. Their study showcases how man-
agers face difficulties in comprehending digital transformation's innovative potential and 
have difficulties setting expectations. For example, in the study of Lanamäki et al. (2020), 
not all actions of actors could be traced back to the strategists' intentions. Instead, they 
noticed that the digital transformation evolved due to reactive actions that slowly trans-
formed the practice and the taxi industry (Figure 3). Vial's (2019) conclusions adopt the 
same thinking by generalizing that digital transformation aims to improve, but the reali-
zation cannot be guaranteed beforehand. In Vial's (2019) review, many studies' focus 
was on improving either firm performance, a particular dimension of the business pro-
cess or the firm's position compared to competitors. Taking into account the different 
entities digital transformation concerns, the expected outcomes of digital transfor-






Figure 3. Relational digital transformation (Lanamäki et al., 2020). 
 
To put it together, Vial (2019) generalizes the definitions of digital transformation's dif-
ferent properties, and this appears to be supported by recent studies on the topic. Con-
sequently, based on the 282 studies on digital transformation, he defines digital trans-
formation followingly: 
 
"a process that aims to improve an entity by triggering significant changes to its 
properties through combinations of information, computing, communication, and 
connectivity technologies" (Vial, 2019: 121) 
  
2.1.2 Digital transformation strategies 
To manage complicated transformations as digital transformation, they must be gov-
erned through established management practices (Matt, Hess & Benlian, 2015). Matt et 
al. (2015) suggest that an example of this is establishing a digital transformation strategy 
that guides the coordination and implementation of new resources. Digital transfor-
mation strategy can be defined as "transformation of products, processes, and organiza-
tional aspects owing to new technologies" (Matt et al., 2015: 339). However, considering 
digital transformation's ambiguous definitions, digital transformation strategy's defini-
tions should also be taken with a grain of salt. For example, Vial (2019) points out the 
incompleteness of the abovementioned definition by Matt et al. (2015), in which 
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the "new technologies" are unclearly defined. However, the study of Matt et al. (2015) 
discusses many essential themes related to digital transformation strategy, such as strat-
egy alignment, some of which are observed subsequently.  
  
Firstly, Chanias et al. (2019) describe digital transformation strategy as a "moving target". 
In their case study, Chanias et al. (2019) found the digital strategy processes were con-
tinuously evolving as the scope of transformation went through changes emerging from 
both top-down and bottom-up initiatives. Their findings support Mintzberg's (1978) cen-
tral strategy process theory, where Mintzberg suggested that strategies develop gradu-
ally as new ones emerge, and they realize through a stream of decisions. Later, infor-
mation systems strategy research has adopted the view where information systems re-
sources are used both to exploit current assets and explore new possibilities to gain com-
petitive advantage (Marabelli & Galliers, 2017). Marabelli et al. (2017) also describe that 
where IS research views IS strategy often emergent rather than planned, the current re-
search has moved its focus from information systems strategy content to strategy pro-
cesses. 
  
The embeddedness of organization-wide strategy processes requires a dynamic ap-
proach from the managers managing the digital transformation (Smith & Beretta, 2020). 
What Smith et al. (2020) suggest is that many incumbent firms encounter challenges 
managing the digital transformation in their day-to-day practices, and the emergent 
strategies surfacing from unfolding transformations can be paradoxid to other strategies 
of the firm if not managed correctly. To manage them, i.e. identifying, implementing, 
and realizing new digital-enabled assets, firms can foster the process by establishing a 
Chief Digital Officer position or formulating a digital transformation strategy (Riedl, 
Benlian, Hess, Stelzer, & Sikora, 2017). However, Vial (2019) found that current research 
perceives a digital transformation strategy, or a digital business strategy, beneficial in 
situations where generic strategies are not enough to explain digital transformation 
strategy set up by industry-wide disruptions. 
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Strategic alignment is one of the most integral streams of study in information systems 
research rising from the beginning of the 1990s when it was first addressed (e.g. Hen-
derson & Venkatraman, 1993). Henderson et al. (1993) describe that information tech-
nology takes a more strategic role in organizations, and one of the primary reasons or-
ganizations are failing to realize value from it was the misalignment between business 
and information technology strategies. They separate two perspectives to alignment that 
both are enabled by new technology: The first one Henderson et al. (1993) describe as a 
competitive potential alignment perspective, where new "information technology capa-
bilities" impact the business strategy. Digital transformation often alters the firm's value 
creation, which results in structural changes within the firm (Matt et al. 2015). Consid-
ering all organizational strategies established in the firm's current organization structure, 
it is significant to acknowledge the extent to which digital transformation is adopted and 
the new skill requirements to manage the alignment correctly (Matt et al., 2015). 
  
Apart from the previous perspective, the information technology strategy should also be 
aligned with the firm's current IS infrastructure, described as a service level alignment 
perspective (Henderson et al. 1993). Matt et al. (2015) argue that research on infor-
mation technology strategies is prone to study this association more excessively than its 
innovative properties. In contrast, Marabelli et al. (2017) argue that information systems 
research, especially its strategy-as-practice stream of studies, is confronted with tensions 
between exploitative and explorative research areas. Furthermore, Matt et al. (2015) 
continue to argue that information technology can be considered one of the firm's func-
tional strategies, which is system-centric rather than addresses the transformation of 
operational and functional properties. As a result, a digital transformation strategy aligns 
with information technology strategy and creates a new strategy that can be leveraged 
in the entire organization (Matt et al., 2015). 
 
Matt et al. (2015) also bring up the central actors in a digital transformation. While ap-
proaching IS strategizing from a strategy-as-practice perspective could be a potential re-
search stream to address the theme (e.g. Marabelli et al., 2017), not many studies can 
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be found discussing strategizing on a practical level in a transformational context (Matt 
et al., 2015). However, many studies discuss Chief Digital Officer (CDO) as a central actor 
in digital transformation (Vial, 2019). Horlacher and Hess (2016) outline that complexi-
ties produced by a digital transformation make it difficult for Chief Innovation Officers 
(CIO) to adjust to their new responsibilities. As a result, firms have started to establish 
CDO positions, whose task is to ensure that digital technologies are leveraged and 
aligned with other strategies within the firm (Horlacher et al., 2016; Vial, 2019). Hor-
lacher et al. (2016) found that the CDOs proactively initiate transformations across dif-
ferent functions, handle digital transformations' strategic aspects, and communicate 
them. As a result, CDOs usually try to overcome the resistance by being the spokesper-
son of the transformation (Horlacher et al., 2016). 
  
When it comes to other roles, CIOs are often perceived to operate in service delivery 
capacity or to represent a support function (Riedl et al., 2017). Riedl et al. (2017) argue 
that if a CIO manages the firm's digital transformation, it increases the CIO's strategic 
influence but can give away CIO's routine tasks to other positions. Kohli et al. (2011) 
argue that if a CIO holds the responsibility for digital transformation, the CEO works 
closely with the CIO. While Kohli and Johnson (2011) do not recognize the position of 
CDO, their statements may be applicable whether CIO or CDO is responsible for the dig-
ital transformation: CEO's tasks involve assisting in decision-making, helping to prioritize 
goals, and jointly establishing metrics for measuring success. 
 
2.1.3 Value proposition 
Matt et al. (2015) suggest that digital transformation often results in a changed value 
proposition, and it appears to be a widely studied area in digital transformation research 
(Vial, 2019). For example, Cennamo et al. (2020) argue that the advantages of digital 
transformation are achieved when firms can leverage ecosystems through new business 
models as the transformation often involves more actors that the organization itself. As 
a result, Cennamo et al. (2020) suggest that the ecosystem-centric value creation logic 
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brings many synergies as greater flexibility, lower hierarchies within firms, and new gov-
erning mechanisms that encourage collaboration. However, Matt et al. (2015) bring up 
that the more modern value creation logic deviates from a firm's core business, the more 
barriers it induces for coping with the transformation. They mention lack of compe-
tences, difficulties in monetizing, and difficulties in adjusting changed business scope as 
challenges digital transformation sets, many of which are answered with structural 
changes (Matt et al., 2015).  
 
Subramaniam, Iyer, and Venkatraman (2019) highlight that emergent technologies and 
continuously unfolding digital transformations have shaped the modern business envi-
ronment to transmute value chains and create interdependencies between firms. They 
also suggest that as traditional companies see how they can leverage the information 
surfacing from different ecosystems, this can work as an initiator for a digital transfor-
mation. However, firms do not necessarily have to be part of the ecosystem to enjoy 
considerable advantages. Schallmo, Williams, and Boardman (2017) point out that the 
advantages can be achieved through smaller networks – by exchanging data or initiating 
processes, fewer organizations can gain mutual benefits. This does not concern only in-
ter-organizational collaboration, but the value-creating network can also be formed in 
customer-organization relationships (Schallmo et al., 2017).  
  
Changes in value creation logic are linked to the channels where the value is extracted 
from (Subranamiam et al., 2019). Subramaniam et al. (2019) distinguish two different 
channels: production and consumption. This interpretation aligns with other studies, dis-
tinguishing digital channels into customer-facing channels, and software-enabled activ-
ity coordination across various functions, especially in production (Vial, 2019). Firstly, 
Klötzer and Pflaum (2017) suggest that instead of physical artifacts, the value can be 
found in "smart" products and digital supply chains in the manufacturing industry, which 
poses challenges for many who are not ready for the change. Whereas Subramaniam et 
al. (2019) discussed customization when it comes to using product-in-use information, 
the possibilities are various. Kohli et al. (2011) describe how a multi-national oil company 
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could synchronize their production with volatile demands and market price forecasts. As 
a result, as the study of Kohli et al. (2011) showcases, that the outcome of digitalized 
production channels can be overall efficiency.  
  
Secondly, the consumption channel described by Subramaniam et al. (2019) links not 
only nested value ecosystems, i.e. versatility of attainable information through a firm's 
network, but also social media (e.g. Horlacher et al., 2016). Horlacher et al. (2016) de-
scribe through their case study how a firm can grow its online share and customer en-
gagement through multichannel management. However, from a value perspective, the 
context is broader than social media considering firms' complementary products and 
services (Subramaniam et al., 2019). Subramaniam et al. (2019) point out that the range 
of complementary products and services is growing, and there are countless third-party 
entities that provide them.  
  
Furthermore, new value creation logic brought by digital transformation appears to be 
linked to organizational agility. Kohli et al. (2011) propose that in volatile markets, firms 
should be able to adapt IT among other functions quickly, and if implemented correctly, 
digital transformation enables process redesign that offers agility in volatile markets. 
From another perspective, Klötzer et al. (2017) suggest that firms who seek network ef-
ficiencies should pay attention to organizational agility as the flow of information crosses 
organizational boundaries. This is due to the lean philosophy unfolding outside the firm's 
boundaries, which should be facilitated with ICT-utilization (Klötzer et al., 2017). There-
fore, it may be possible that digital transformation plays a more significant role in differ-
ent ecosystems as discussed (e.g. Sunramaniam et al., 2019) since if the digital maturity 
of cooperative firms differs a lot, it may affect their response to the market changes as a 
whole. 
  
As in the case study of Kohli et al. (2011), also Chanias et al. (2019) found that agility and 
flexibility were some of the main drivers of the digital transformation strategy. Chanias 
et al. (2019) suggest that digital transformation strategy should promote the empirical 
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approach of "trial and error", which shows how agile concerns not only existing assets 
and resources but also strategy. As a result, it is understandable that firms that seek to 
implement an agile approach simultaneously with their digital transformation are ex-
posed to different challenges (Smith et al., 2020). Smith et al. (2020) discovered how 
their case firm faced different paradoxes in agile implementation emerging from organ-
izing, attention paid to projects, and knowledge management. What Smith et al. (2020) 
suggest is that already agile organizations can manage the paradoxes more successfully 
and are more able to adopt complex transformations. 
 
2.2 Dynamic capabilities and organizational microfoundations 
Microfoundations is about individuals, processes, and structures that through their in-
teractions, contribute to the emergence of collective constructs (Felin et al., 2012). From 
a strategic management perspective, Felin and Foss (2005) note that organizations are 
not only organizations but are made of individuals, which is often neglected in under-
standing organizations as strategic entities. In recent research, Felin et al. (2015) high-
light microfoundations as research heuristics to macro-management and a fit dimension 
to study digital transformation. This chapter aims to understand better the interplay be-
tween the macro-level and micro-levels of an organization when top-down changes are 
implemented. 
 
Figure 4 puts together how dynamic capabilities and microfoundations are approached 
in this study. While dynamic capabilities cut through different levels of organization, rou-
tines, motivations, and social networks are studied with a bottom-up approach. This en-
ables us to study the emergence of microfoundations where current resources are ex-
ploited and offers a good starting point to understand employee-level inertia. For exam-
ple, Eisenhardt et al. (2010) argue that operational efficiencies are one source for econ-
omies of scale and scope and help manage the firm in dynamic marketplaces. Addition-
ally, there is still limited empirical knowledge of how societal and strategic challenges 
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related to digital transformation can be managed at the operational level of organiza-
tions (Smith et al., 2020). Overall, Smith et al. (2020) argue that how digital transfor-




Figure 4. Conceptual framework for microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. 
 
2.2.1 Dynamic capabilities 
Dynamic capabilities refer to a firm's use of its resources to meet or even initiate a mar-
ket change (Eisenhardt et al., 2000). Eisenhardt et al. (2000) describe that the resource-
based view sees resources as the most important asset of the firm, and with the correct 
use of them, organizations are able to create value-creating strategies. Teece (2007) dis-
tinguishes dynamic capabilities into sensing, seizing, and reconfiguring capabilities (Fig-
ure 6). Eisenhardt et al. (2010) argue that many organizations compete in increasingly 
dynamic environments, technology being one of the destabilizing forces, which calls for 
managing dynamic capabilities more efficiently. Furthermore, as new opportunities and 
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threats are triggered continuously, reshaping dynamic capabilities can be considered ap-




Figure 5. Dynamic capabilities (Teece, 2007). 
  
Firstly, Teece (2007) argues that the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities may 
emerge from individuals' sensing opportunities that requires both information and abil-
ities (capabilities and knowledge) to "sense" them. According to him, this can take place 
in macro processes, but the requirements regarding capabilities and knowledge remain. 
However, Teece (2007) acknowledges that despite the sensing can be initiated from the 
micro level, an organization must scale those skills into the organization's processes as 
they cannot remain nimble if they are dependent on the skills of few actors. Helfat and 
Peteraf (2015) point out that despite Teece (2007) highlights the role of organization and 
top-level management in sensing opportunities, the cognitive capabilities needed for 
sensing are spread around heterogeneously. 
  
Helfat et al. (2015) argue that individuals' heterogeneity that affects their cognitive ca-
pabilities to sense emerges from differences in abilities to sense, concentrate, filter irrel-
evant information, and perceive information.  Helfat et al. (2015) note that the abilities 
can be improved, increasing the heterogeneity of organizational performance equally 
how the abilities accumulate for early movers. The heterogeneity of individuals is some-
thing Teece (2007) does not discuss but instead emphasizes open innovation and inno-
vation at the enterprise level. Therefore, regardless of his criticism towards Porter's Five 
Forces model's exogenic approach, his views on microfoundations remain narrow. 
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Warner et al. (2019) suggest that to answer better the fast-changing and technology-
intensive marketplace, capabilities of "digital scouting", "digital scenario planning", and 
"digital mindset crafting" should be developed. 
  
The second capability, seizing, takes place after an opportunity or threat is sensed, and 
concentrates on how they can be addressed through products or services (Teece, 2007). 
Teece (2007) explains how seizing can also be defined as how the managers perceive the 
customers' desires. His conceptualization relies heavily on enterprise-level solutions and 
argues how top management actions should strive for group commitment to innovate 
and meet those opportunities and threats. Helfat et al. (2015) argue that cognitive ca-
pabilities realize in investment decisions when it comes to seizing or designing a new 
business model, something that Teece (2007) widely discusses. However, Helfat et al. 
(2015) detail how abilities to seize, decisions to invest, and business model changes 
emerge from a heterogenic workforce's cognitive capabilities and skills. 
  
Helfat et al. (2015) continue to argue that cognitive capabilities actualize abilities to solve 
and reason problems. They distinguish abilities to solve problems in either controlled 
rational approaches or "heuristic processing", latter of which is a much less analytical 
approach of jumping to a solution and working backward. Both approaches resemble 
the approaches to decision-making by Betsch et al. (2014), which distinguished deliber-
ate and rule-based perspectives. Therefore, Helfat et al. (2015) argue that managers' 
abilities to seize opportunities are dependent on the effectiveness of these problem solv-
ing and reasoning abilities. They also highlight that these cognitive processes are heter-
ogeneous, and the ones who can manage them efficiently will design superior business 
models and make more intelligent investment decisions.  
  
Lastly, Teece (2007) defines the reconfiguration capability of how profitably growing or-
ganizations can recombine and reconfigure assets as the organization grows, and as the 
marketplace and technologies change. Warner et al. (2019) add that "improving digital 
maturity" is one of the required dynamic capabilities introduced by technology-intensive 
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marketplaces. The microfoundations of reconfiguration capability stem from abilities to 
decentralize, cospecialize (i.e. operational adoption and fit between different assets), 
and manage knowledge and the governance within the firm (Teece, 2007). Helfat et al. 
(2015) highlight that it also requires choice and action from the managers. They continue 
that the cognitive capabilities of "languages", communication and social cognition, ben-
efit managers in coordinating and overcoming the possible resistance to change.  
  
Here, "language" refers to verbal communication, other than non-verbal means to signal 
the communicator's message (Helfat et al., 2015). Together with other forms of commu-
nication, Helfat et al. (2015) elaborate that these abilities affect managers' skills to per-
suade, foster alignment, inspire in front of reconfiguration and the change it brings. They 
highlight that the abilities are essential for affecting employee response to change. Ad-
ditionally, skilled managers can implement their social cognition capability to endorse 
cooperation among employees through understanding other viewpoints, which is a 
highly heterogeneous skill (Helfat et al., 2015). In summary, Eisenhardt et al. (2010) ar-
gue that the cognitive variety among members of an organization offers flexibility and 
efficiency regarding problem-solving, which indicates that all managers do not need to 
have equally high cognitive capabilities to carry out changes. However, managers' supe-
rior cognitive skills are linked to higher organizational performance. This relates to man-
agerial dynamic capabilities perspective, and how individual instances explain dynamic 
capabilities. This remains as one of the research streams that advances research on the 
microfoundations of dynamic capabilities. (Schilke et al., 2018.) 
 
2.2.2 Routines and motivations 
Routines are studied to understand the connection between individuals and their actions. 
Collins (1981) describes how individuals pursue to make rational decisions but are often 
met with different limitations. For example, he raises the limitations of finding a compa-
rable metric between the different alternatives, or narrow limited in the decision. In sit-
uations like these, people tend to rely on routine rather than investing a lot in the deci-
sion (Collins, 1981). Routines theoretically link to capabilities, and it appears that they 
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have implications for their respective microfoundations and are worth studying (Felin et 
al., 2012). For example, Lewin, Massini, and Peeters (2011) describe how routines link to 
firms' absorptive capacity in technologically intensive business environments, and the 
capacity can be developed by reflecting processes and updating their affected routines.  
 
Decision-making is either a deliberate or rule-based process (Betsch & Haberstroh, 2004: 
3–4). Betsch et al. (2004: 3–4) characterize deliberate decision-making as calculative 
with enough rationale to decide on, and the later one is limited by experience or 
knowledge. They continue to describe that repeated exposure to a specific task develops 
a routine that emphasizes the rule-based process and will develop the individual's be-
havior in the long term. Additionally, they point out that cognitive science acknowledges 
different approaches to how routines are formed, many of them agreeing that experi-
ence makes the decision process more efficient. Abell, Felin, and Foss (2008) explain that 
the process of developing routines mentioned above is indirectly reasoned to be one of 
the sources of competitive advantage due to better coordination of activities or over-
coming prisoner's dilemma situations.  
 
Abell et al. (2008) acknowledge that the capabilities view has "black-boxed" research on 
routines (Figure 5). To illustrate this, Felin et al. (2005) argue that since organizational 
capabilities are often studied at the collective level, the focus gets easily lost from indi-
vidual-level considerations. For example, despite having a great emphasis on under-
standing routines in the context of adopting innovations and their general emphasis on 
the microfoundations, also Lewin et al. (2011) approach routines from a collective level. 
Felin et al. (2005) state the collective approach derives from assumption of individual 
homogeneity which conflicts with cognitive sciences which emphasizes the role of het-
erogeneous prior knowledge. They point out that this does not determine that the col-






Figure 6. Explanation of routines (Abell et al., 2008). 
 
Another parallel cognitive process that helps to understand an individual's actions from 
a microfoundations perspective is motivation. Research on motivations strives to explain 
why and how humans behave. The universal approach to motivated human action is dis-
tinguished between our desire to control and moments of goal engagement and disen-
gagement. When it comes to control striving, the tendency has been addressed in re-
search based on mammals' preference for behavior-event contingencies, use of explora-
tion to control the external environment, and asymmetric patterns of affective responses 
to events. Here, positive events are reacted with positive affect and vice versa. On the 
other hand, goal engagement and disengagement can be described as motivational 
modes of "go" and "stop", where the individual is committed to the goal or not, which 
guides their behavior. (Heckhausen & Heckhausen, 2008: 1–2.) 
 
Foss and Lindenberg (2013) argue that setting strategic goals respective to firm perfor-
mance is essential due to value creation's emergence from employee motivations and 
strategic goals' overreach over the members of the organization. Extracting from the 
goal-framing theory that distinguishes between different overreaching goals, Foss et al. 
(2013) state that those goals can either reflect a desire to improve how one feels (he-
donic), desire to improve one's resources (goal), or desire to act appropriately in collec-
tive context (normative). Ultimately, the goal of Foss et al. (2013) is to light up the de-
pendencies between cognitive and motivational sciences and strategic management 
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theory. This seems to be appropriate, since as Collins (1981) concludes, actors' situa-
tional motivations complicate the macro discipline and the dynamics of social structure, 
counting types of inertia, are micro-situational. 
 
Lindenberg and Foss (2011) propose that the firm's value creation is ultimately up to 
motivation among employees and how they can self-organize to reach common goals. 
Linberg et al. (2011) also conceptualize a normative framework for motivating employ-
ees called "joint production motivation" that highlights how organizational antecedents 
turn employee motivation into organizational benefits. Their bottom line is that organi-
zations should move from individual incentives to joint production conditions by scaling 
the cognitive process of motivation to a collective level. They continue to propose sev-
eral normative elements to foster beneficial employee motivation more efficiently as 
transparent task and team designs, group-level rewards, and mutual understanding. 
 
2.2.3 Social networks and knowledge sharing 
Networks create a structure of constraints and opportunities among the individuals that 
interact. Significant decisions are often trusted on other individuals of the same network, 
and members of the organization perceive the organizational relationships accurately 
hold an advantageous position. Individuals are also likely to interact with individuals with 
similar attributes, and the group identification gets stronger the less there are people 
with similar attributes. Equally important is to acknowledge networks of smaller compo-
nents dyads, triads, and cliques. Therefore, knowing both which individuals form the dif-
ferent units of people and who influence their decision-making are both important. 
(Kilduff & Tsai, 2003: 10–11.) 
 
When it comes to the influence of networks within an organization, Tasselli, Kilduff, and 
Menges (2015) argue that networks socially constrain individuals. Where Kilduff et al. 
(2003: 10) stated that people with similar attributes form networks, Tasselli et al. (2015) 
continue even further that network "makes" people to share similar values in essence. 
They elaborate it by pointing that two independent individuals with similar positions are 
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likely to develop similar attitudes. Additionally, when considering adoption, skilled indi-
viduals are able to persuade and influence on others with their social leverage (Muller 
et al., 2019). Hence, understanding the organization's networks can be essential to know 
how employees perceive a change, such as a digital transformation.  
 
Muller and Peres (2019) suggest that social networks and their relation to innovation 
market performance are prominent research areas in innovation research. According to 
Muller et al. (2019), the underlying attribute in this phenomenon is how social networks 
affect their members' adoption behaviors. They continue that it stems from the social 
contagion that was discussed earlier (e.g. Tasselli et al., 2015) and how it influences the 
adoption decisions of network members. Liu, Huang, Dou, and Zhao (2017) found that 
the innovation capability of the firm is indirectly influenced by its networks through the 
knowledge acquisition that takes place in the social interactions between the individuals. 
However, Liu et al. (2017) note that this phenomenon is much less well-known than the 
social interactions between buyers and suppliers, such as how it influences one's organ-
ization's innovation capacity. 
 
Muller et al. (2019) highlight some of the key characteristics from social network theory 
that induce adoption. Firstly, social interaction brings its members aware of the innova-
tion. Secondly, learning takes place in the interactions, and not only is information con-
veyed, but also the individuals in the same network have an influential role. The more 
familiarity there is concerning the information source, the more trusted the source will 
become. Thirdly, normative pressure emerges from this peer perception. When a peer 
has adopted a product, the peer who has not becomes a potential adopter. Lastly, in 
some cases, network externalities take place when the number of adopters increases the 
usability of the product. (Muller et al., 2019.) 
 
Lewin et al. (2011) highlight that building networks based on face-to-face interactions 
creates trust, commitment, and respect, all crucial to knowledge transfer processes. In 
cohesive networks in which individuals are embedded based on their shared attributes, 
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individuals can adopt more complex information (Muller et al., 2019). Muller et al. 
(2019) continue that the more ties per node there is in a network, the faster new 
adopters emerge, and the number of adopters, magnitude, improves. Marouf (2007) ap-
proaches the knowledge sharing within networks based on business and social ties and 
acknowledges how network research is firmly based on the separation of strong and 
weak ties. Marouf (2007) argues that the business relationship's strength contributes 
significantly more in sharing public information than a strong social relationship in shar-
ing private information. However, as Kilduff et al. (2003: 54) discuss, it appears that more 
emphasis is on the strength of tie than the nature of it. 
 
However, Kilduff et al. (2003: 55–56) highlight that weak relationships are not wasted, 
but they can often form bridges between different networks. Moreover, Kilduff et al. 
(2003: 56) continue that weak ties transmit information between dense networks due 
to their acquaintanceship nature and create cohesion among the fragmented structures. 
Felin et al. (2015) describe how bridging behaviors stimulate knowledge-based ad-
vantages at the macro-level, and it can be useful for organizations to recognize these 
individuals who create bridges and what ties they form between different networks. 
However, Marouf (2007) emphasizes that it is still structured knowledge that leads to 
macro-level learning and long-term benefits. Similarly, Abell et al. (2008) propose that 
the knowledge cannot be centralized only in the top management, and routines play a 
role in distributing tacit knowledge.  
 
2.3 Organizational inertia in the context of digital transformation 
The previous discussion on dynamic capabilities and microfoundations shows how com-
plex the micro-level processes can be in a transformational context, and it was demon-
strated how individual action stems from cognition ultimately. Schmid (2019) raises that 
many studies have found inertia to play a significant role in a digital transformation. For 
example, Makkonen, Johnston, and Javalgi (2016) argue that where the adoption of new 
technologies is a "critical determinant" to stay competitive, the biggest challenge of 
managing adoption behaviors is to control structural inertia. While dynamic capabilities 
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link to transforming organizations successfully (Teece, 2007), the new value creation 
paths are therefore affected by organizational inertia and can result in firms not realizing 
the value from the transformation (Figure 7). Followingly, different types of inertia are 
observed in the context of digital transformation to understand better organizational in-




Figure 7. Digital transformation process (adapted from Vial, 2019). 
 
2.3.1 Conceptualization of organizational inertia 
The concept of inertia originates from physics and refers to how force must be applied 
to get a matter moving or stop from moving. Otherwise, the matter keeps moving or stay 
still, respectively. One of the most influential studies in organizational inertia theory, 
Hannan and Freeman (1984), describes how radical changes in organizations' strategy 
and structure rarely succeeded in front of external pressure. They argue that as the 
adoption of new organizational structures takes place at the population level, differences 
in succeeding in formulating new strategy and structure are partially explained by iner-
tial forces. For example, cognition, routines, capabilities, resource commitments can be 
sources of inertia (Tripsas, 2009). Formal organizations have the advantage of reliability 
and stability, but they come with the downside of organization members wanting to keep 
the status quo (Hannan et al., 1984). Kelly and Amburgey (1991) found that where old 
organizations are more exposed to major changes to their core processes than younger 
ones, the inertia was also greater. As a result, old organizations are constrained by their 
history. Interestingly, support is also found that environmental change is associated to 
decrease in the probability of corporate-level change. (Kelly et al., 1991.) Consequently, 
Hannan and Freeman (1984: 151) define inertia followingly: 
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"... speed of reorganization is much lower than the rate at which environmental 
conditions change." 
  
2.3.2 Structural inertia 
According to Hannan et al. (1984), structural inertia emerges when an organization is 
slow to adjust its structure in response to changing external environment. They highlight 
that it does not mean that organizations would never change; instead, high inertia re-
sults in challenges to keep up with the changes in the external environment. For example, 
in a longitudal study focusing on internationalization of firms, Guillén (2002) observed 
South Korean firms’ exapansion to China. In order to overcome structural inertia caused 
by changing environment and passage of time, firms were prone to imitate the entry of 
other South Korean firms to China. Continuing from Hannan et al. (1984), Hannan, Pólos, 
and Carroll (2004) note that structural change often creates a momentum that often 
results in a complete reorganization, and if avoided, it can be deadly for an organization. 
Individual's routines constrain the structural response as relying on routine is an unsuit-
able response to change (Schwarz, 2012). However, Yi, Knudsen, and Becker (2016) 
found that it can be vice versa, and routine rigidity offers the potential to explore how 
organizational adoption should be carried out at the micro-level timely.  
  
Some of critique structural inertia theorization has met relates to neglecting internal 
forces since first studies in this area (e.g. Hannan et al., 1984) focus on adopting new 
structural changes due to external pressure (Schwarz, 2012). For example, Coyle & Horn 
(2009) describe a situation where it took three years for a telecom company to create a 
new planning process to meet the competition, but resulted in lost market share despite 
the threat was not immediate. After revisiting the concept and acknowledging some 
controversies related to their argumentation in Hannan et al. (1984), Hannan et al. (2004) 
define architectural inertia, organizational resistance to changing architecture. On the 
micro-level, Schwarz (2012) distinguishes between unobtrusive (structural) inertia, 
which refers to support and agreement on the need for new structural changes, and de-
liberate (structural) inertia, emerging from its intentional initiation. Schwarz (2012) finds 
that deliberate inertia explains the willingness to maintain the status quo since its nature 
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is predictable and instructive. However, as Hannan et al. (2004) put it, deliberate reluc-
tance delays the cascade and can prohibit a company from making catastrophic changes 
to organizational structure. 
  
Verhoef et al. (2019) acknowledge that research within "digital firms" and organization 
structure is scarce, but their association is still important. For example, they raise organ-
izational agility, cross-functional teams, self-organization, and ambidexterity as promi-
nent future research areas. When it comes to traditional organizations, the greater the 
firm in concern is in size, the greater the organizational inertia also towards agile trans-
formation (Dikert, Paasivaara, & Lassenius, 2016; Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Dikert et al. 
(2016) found general resistance to change, skepticism towards new working methods, 
and top-down mandate creating resistance towards agile transformations. The chal-
lenges raised by Dikert et al. (2016) resonate with the findings of Schwartz (2012); all of 
them can all be considered as either deliberate or unobtrusive inertia depending on the 
employees' motivation for structural change (Schwartz, 2012).   
 
2.3.3 Socio-technical inertia 
Schmid et al. (2017) agree that information technology should serve the competitiveness 
and agility of the firm, but the rigidity in the interactions of social actors and information 
technology can create the opposite effect. Due to this tension between the different 
roles of information technology, Schmid et al. (2017) argue that understanding inertia is 
essential in the digital transformation context. He continues to define socio-technical 
inertia as this rigidity between human actors and information technology. In fact, in his 
more recent research Schmid (2019) describes that the essence of digital transformation 
lies in the change in these deep socio-technical structures. The definition of Besson et al. 
(2012) highlights individuals' embeddedness in these structures and how the develop-
ment of time and consistency strengthens the inertia. However, the definition of Rowe, 
et al. (2017) is better aligned with the dominant definition of inertia by Hannan et al. 
(1984) and states that socio-technical inertia emerges when socio-technical systems do 
not keep in the pace of environmental changes.  
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For example, in their study of electronic vehicle market, Stenhilber, Wells, and Than-
kappan (2013) found that the penetration of electric vehicles is made more difficult by 
the socio-technical inertia caused by immature technology that has not reached a level 
of commericialization yet. In their study, Besson et al. (2012) found that the socio-tech-
nical inertia was dominant compared to other forms of inertia they argued to exist at the 
business level. They continue to describe that organizational transformation's socio-
technical dimension consists of modularity, scalability, and interoperability, and how new 
technologies are more flexible and scalable. Besson et al. (2012) accommodate to the 
findings of Hannan et al. (1984) of how organizational maturity affects the amount iner-
tia by noting that young organizations are more capable adapt organization architectures 
enabled by these advantages of new technologies mentioned above. 
  
Dobbs, Koller, and Ramaswamy (2015) argue that in the age of digital disruption, it be-
comes more important for companies to disrupt themselves before a competitor does 
it. They connect this to the legacy assets many companies cope with, and how they cre-
ate significant productivity gaps. While Schmid (2019) describes how the outer context 
for socio-technical inertia is similar to other definitions of inertia (e.g. Hannan et al., 
1984; Rowe et al., 2017), the two-part interaction separates it. Schmid (2019) distin-
guishes between social and material – humans acting within their cognitive frames and 
social systems and the concrete entities with their overreaching architectures that create 
rigidity. Here, it is the interplay of both these socio-technical dimensions that distinguish 
it from socio-cognitive inertia, which highlights more individual routines and motivations, 
according to Besson et al. (2012). Schmid (2019) adds that apart from these architectural 
elements, skill allocation and process configurations can also create inertia. 
  
Firms equipped with dynamic capabilities appear to have prerequisites to diminish the 
influence of socio-technical inertia (Rowe et al., 2017; Setzke, 2020). Rowe et al. (2017) 
argue that dynamic capabilities of sensing, routinizing past transformations, and recon-
figuring strategic resources are used by firms to balance the inertia. Setzke (2020) has 
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somewhat similar results but does not emphasize the role of individual capability equally 
and focuses rather on the combination of capabilities. For example, he highlights the 
role of reconfiguring when combined with a centralized planning approach and does not 
find any support for seizing capabilities in reducing inertia. Therefore, stating that dy-
namic capabilities reduce socio-technical inertia is not unambiguous, and as Schmid 
(2019) puts it, the inertia is counterbalanced rather than overcome. 
 
2.3.4 Cognitive inertia 
Betsch et al. (2004: 3–4) argued that deliberate or rule-based behaviors guide an indi-
vidual's decision-making processes, and if an individual does not have enough experi-
ence or knowledge to make a deliberate decision, the decision is based on a rule. Cog-
nitive inertia refers to the rigidity of different cognitive frames that weakens an organi-
zation's ability to sense and adapt to changes (Laureiro-Martínez & Brusoni, 2018). Kim 
and Mauborgne (2003) see it relating to strategic reorientation, and how managers need 
to put face-to-face with problems and customers. For example, they describe how sen-
ior staff officers in NYTP were not able to step in their subordinates shoes, as they did 
not use public transportation themselves. Laureiro-Martínez et al. (2018) suggest that 
the phenomenon is larger than the interplay mentioned above between deliberate and 
rule-based behaviors, and research often adopts the view that it is the less-deliberate 
behavior that creates the inertia. Correspondingly, Tripsas et al. (2000) bring up cogni-
tive adoption and how unsuccessful adoption of cognitive frames results in dysfunction-
alities that can be deadly for organizations.  
  
Laureiro-Martínez et al. (2018) argue that cognitive inertia emerges when an individual 
does not adapt their decision-making behavior as required. They name this phenome-
non as "cognitive flexibility", where semiautomatic or deliberate responses are made 
after careful consideration of appropriate behavior. For example, Tripsas et al. (2000) 
discuss how Polaroid's top management was not able to make deliberate decisions when 
the competitive landscape was changing, which resulted in Polaroid being left behind in 
the quickly digitalizing imaging industry. Tripsas et al. (2000) add that not only cognitive 
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models such as routines are a source of inertia but also beliefs related to a firm's strategy. 
However, Yi et al. (2016) argue that inertia in routines reduces variability and offers sta-
bility when changes are made in the task environment. Although, as per organizational 
theorization, also Yi et al. (2016) note that routines slow down the adoption process, 
and they are a well-known source of organizational inertia.  
  
Liang et al. (2017) separate resource rigidity and routine rigidity, where routine rigidity 
is divided into path dependence and cognitive inertia. This highlights how cognitive in-
ertia concerns how individuals use their cognitive maps at a given moment of the deci-
sion compared to path dependence built up due to past decisions (Liang et al., 2017). 
However, self-reinforcing routines can develop into cognitive inertia over time, which 
points out the paradox where rule-based decision-making should be used at appropriate 
moments to remain adoptive, but the result is the opposite if used excessively (Laureiro-
Martínez et al., 2018; Liang et al., 2017). Tripsas et al. (2000) acknowledge that path 
dependency can also be a source of inertia but cannot fully explain capability develop-
ment difficulties. To elaborate on this, Tripsas (2009) describes how the feeling of threat 
coming from new technology can result in investing resources that support existing rou-
tines – a decision not dependent on the past decisions but rather the cognitive state at 
that moment. 
  
Also Gilbert (2005) distinguishes between resource rigidity, failure to change resource 
investments patterns, and routine rigidity, failure to change  processes that use those 
resources. Most importantly, their causal mechanisms differ: whereas perception of 
threat helps to overcome inertia in resources, it effect on inertia in routines is opposite 
(Gilbert, 2005). Betsch et al. (2004: 176) raise the persistency hypothesis that homoge-
nous groups are more prone to stick to shared routines compared to individuals. How-
ever, Betsch et al. (2004: 189) agree with the views of Yi et al. (2016) that routine rigidity 
is not necessarily an obstacle but can rather give time to come up with a better problem-
solving process. In other words, once groups come up with a better problem-solving so-
lution despite it would take more time, the routines do not have to be actively managed, 
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which benefits the firm in the long run. If the benefits of this slowed-down change pro-
cess realize, a firm can find ways for further exploration and adaptation (Yi et al., 2016). 
However, in the context of external threat, it is not enough for managers  to commit 
when it comes to resources, but to take also into account the power of threat on rou-
tines (Gilbert, 2005). 
 
2.4 Synthesis 
Different phenomena, such as financial performance or diversification patterns, are of-
ten explained with macro-level phenomena in strategic management (Abell et al., 2008). 
Abell et al. (2008) argue that common measurement units as routines and capabilities 
need a more thorough understanding of their origins. Felin et al. (2005) add that multi-
level analysis in strategic management tends to borrow some psychological theories 
without more comprehensive analysis. Felin et al. (2005) also criticize that many studies 
fall short of acknowledging when it is appropriate to approach the unit of measurement 
with a macro or micro-level lens, and many macro-level structures need more micro-
level analysis to understand the phenomenon better. Recently, Felin et al. (2015) have 
argued that the microfoundations movement has impacted the macro discipline and re-
mains important explanative variable in different contexts. 
  
The proposed framework for the empirical part of this study is refined from Lenka, Parida, 
Sjödin, and Wincent (2018), which discusses organizational resistance towards the ser-
vitization strategy and how it can be overcome at the micro-level (Figure 8). The use of 
the framework is justified considering the similar tension between micro-level variable 
and top-down transformation initiative. It makes a clear distinction between macro and 
micro-level processes, something that Felin et al. (2005) have paid attention to. It also 
aligns with the general model of social science explanation discussed in Abell et al. 
(2008), and individual-organization relationship presented in Felin et al. (2005). Both of 
those frameworks highlight the individual's role as an explanative variable of macro-level 





Figure 8. A model of individual-organization interaction during digital transformation 
(modified based on Lenka et al., 2018). 
 
To conclude, digital transformation, microfoundations research, and types of organiza-
tional inertia were studied to understand the current state of the literature on organiza-
tional inertia in the context of digital transformation. The chosen lens for this examina-
tion was microfoundations literature. This sets the starting point for empirical studying 
on how organizational inertia connects with individual-level considerations and how 
firms can improve their digital transformation strategy implementation. The model of 
individual-organization interaction during digital transformation is aligned with the re-




This chapter aims to introduce the methodological premise of this study, given the re-
search questions. This includes the introduction to the case selection process and data 
collection and analysis methods. Lastly, the reliability and validity of this study are ad-
dressed. The empirical part is carried out in a retrospective setting due to nature of the 
chosen case: Keltainen Pörssi (The Yellow Stock Market in Finnish) was Finland's most 
popular advertising magazine known especially for its C2C trade. First published in 1986, 
Keltainen Pörssi held almost a monopolistic market position around the 2000s. Beside 
the print, Keltainen Pörssi had established an online media in 1996. In a fast-changing 
environment, the print was first to be shut down in 2012, followed by the online media 
in 2016. This sets the starting point for a more detail observation of the case study as 
the single case study provides an illustration of established firm’s rigidity for a successful 
renewal. 
 
3.1 Research method and design 
This study confronts presented strategic and organizational theory with an empirical 
case. The questioning of this study endorses qualitative methods of business research to 
answer the research questions. Qualitative methods are descriptive, and focus on the 
evidence that enables to understand the meaning of what is going on through what peo-
ple tell you and what they do (Gillham, 2000: 10). The choice of qualitative methodology 
is supported by the limited knowledge of factors influencing the emergence and over-
coming of the chosen types of organizational inertia (O'Gorman & MacIntosh, 2014: 66). 
Additionally, as the primary data lies in the interviewees' cognition and experiences, and 
to understand the phenomenon's underlying processes, acquiring qualitative data sup-
ports the research strategy of this study (O'Gorman et al., 2014: 78). This methodological 
premise builds up the abductive reasoning of this study, which rather than testing a the-
ory, emphasizes making sense of what is found after it is found (Gillham, 2000: 6).  
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This study implements a single case study design. Firstly, the chosen case's criticality and 
uniqueness endorse the selection of a single case as the empirical research method 
(O'Gorman et al., 2014: 83). The criticality emerges from the theoretical perspective of 
this study, and how understanding on the microfoundations of dynamic capabilities is 
limited (Schilke et al., 2018). On other hand, Keltainen Pörssi is unique in that it was one 
of the first ones to establish an e-commerce platform in its market, yet this new era of 
commerce posed significant challenges for Keltainen Pörssi. Furthermore, the case is ob-
served retrospectively with a longitude investigation period of over several years, which 
merits the use of this method (O'Gorman et al., 2014: 83). Secundary data is obtained 
to understand how the conditions in a real-life situation changed during a longer period 
of time, while the primary data focuses on a shorter and critical time period that centers 
around the acquisition by Sanoma. As a result, the evidence is obtained from more than 
one source which is one of the key characterisics for case study research (Gillham, 2000: 
2). The end-result will strive to comprehend the challenges Keltainen Pörssi faced and 
develop new theory outlooks. 
 
The chosen case will be used for exploratory research. This research choice is motivated 
by the inadequateness of current knowledge and broad research questions designed to 
build a theory on the phenomenon (O'Gorman et al., 2014: 82). This supports the ex-
plorative nature of case studies, which often focus on a "bounded system" defined by 
time and place (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015: 131). In this study, the time period starts 
from 1996 and ends in 2016. As mentioned above, the secundary data covers the obser-
vation of this time period, while the primary data centers around the 2000s where many 
significant and determining events took place. Therefore, this case study aims not to test 
theory constrained by hypothesis but to build knowledge on the meaning of the events 
during that time period as a basis for inductive reasoning. The lack of well-known and 
unsuccessful digital transformation cases in Finland puts exceptional value on the explor-
atory nature of this case study, outside of its research strategy context. For example, 
according to the study of McKinsey that only 16 percent of digital transformation are 
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successful (Boutetiere & Reich, 2018), but Finnish cases other than Nokia are difficult to 
point out (e.g. Vuori et al., 2016). 
 
3.2 Case selection process 
The starting point for this case selection process was to make a selection among indus-
tries that have gone through a digital transformation. Per Vial (2019), industry is an ap-
propriate entity to observe digital transformation. The non-profit organization, World 
Economic Forum, evaluated in 2016 media as an industry that has already gone through 
several digitization waves. As a result, the boundaries between media and technology 
industries have broken down, and both traditional media companies and digitally-na-
tives are expected to be technology-centric. (World Economic Forum, 2016.) Digitaliza-
tion changes media industry fundamentally, and firms face constantly demands for op-
erational and organizational change. Where operational efficiency is expected, compa-
nies are also expected to explore when it comes to content, processes, and business 
models. (Maijanen & Virta, 2017.) As Maijanen et al. (2017) describe, the digital trans-
formation of the industry has led firms to implement multiplatform approaches, and 
change their strategies to respond to the change. Hence, the media industry was consid-
ered appropriate for this study. 
 
Especially publishers have been affected of the digital transformation of the media in-
dustry. Sanoma Oyj is the biggest media group in Finland and known publisher of Hel-
singin Sanomat. Interest focused on publications Sanoma and other identified publishers 
have possibly divested or shut down. Based on a throughout search, several publications 
appeared. Sanoma's publication Keltainen Pörssi was selected as the case publication 
based on two principles. Firstly, whereas Keltainen Pörssi started as a tabloid-sized print 
in 1986, it was shut down in 2012. The online media, Keltainenporssi.fi, was also shut 
down after few years in 2016. Secondly, the sales of magazines and periodicals have con-
stantly decreased, and internet has taken its market share from them (Figure 9). In other 
words, despite of its successful launch of online media, Keltainen Pörssi is an example 
unsuccessful response to industry-wide digital transformation, and therefore the case is  
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expected to provide information on organizational inertia in the context of an organiza-




Figure 9. Mass media market volume in Finland 1997–2012 (adapted from Ti-
lastokeskus, 2020). 
 
3.3 Data collection and analysis 
The data for this study is developed from primary and secondary sources. How both were 
collected and analyzed is introduced next.  
 
3.3.1 Primary data 
The primary data was collected by interviewing five former executives and managers. 
Every interviewee held a tenure of several years in their role, that centered around the 
dot-com bubble burst in the early 2000s. The gathered sample of interviewees held stra-
tegically important roles in regard to Keltainen Pörssi – a CEO, president and vice presi-
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received about the time both before and after the acquisition by Sanoma. The interviews 
were long-term retrospective, which opens possibilities for memory loss regarding the 
subject (Danneels, 2010). As a result, the empiric data was triangulated with secondary 
data from publicly available sources. All interviewees were Finnish nationals, and the 
interviews were held in Finnish to capture the correct meanings of the answers and to 
group the answers more accurately. The answers also transcribed to English by the au-
thor immediately after the interviews in order to capture the meanings as accurately as 
possible. The interviews were carried out remotely between December 2020 and Janu-
ary 2021 by using video-communication tools. 
  
The interviews were carried out based on the principles of semi-structured interviews. 
Semi-structured interviews enable reliable comparability between different interviews, 
which will help analyze efforts (O'Gorman et al., 2014: 119). O'Gorman et al. (2014: 199) 
continue that other strengths of semi-structured interviews cover all critical points while 
offering some flexibility for interviewees to express themselves. Although unstructured 
interviews are sometimes preferred in explorative research, this study was limited by 
time and the number of possibilities to conduct the interviews. Additionally, the retro-
spective setting was one of the key determinants in selecting interview type due to the 
interviewees' potential memory loss and the goal to gather comparable data. With sim-
ilar reasoning, the questions were open-ended and followed a thematic order (Appendix 
1). They focused on the circumstances during the interviewee's tenure and reflected the 
chosen theory baseline for this research. The transcribed data was interpreted through 
content analysis. The process of categorizing and coding the interview data was aligned 
was the research questions and ensured finding the existing and non-existing relation-
ships between the interview data sets. While the challenge of the content analysis re-
mained to be the amount of superfluous material, through a careful interpretation, the 
comparability between the data sets was assured. The process was data-driven, which 
was realized in the execution of the coding process.  
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3.3.2 Secondary data 
Empirical data can be gathered from different sources, and case study researchers often 
engage in this triangulation. Gathering data from different sources contributes to a more 
objective analysis of the case by cross-checking the content (Eriksson et al., 2015: 138). 
An example of data triangulation is combining primary data with secondary data from a 
different source (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). Secondary data describes the researcher's al-
ready-available data to analyze (O'Gorman et al., 2014: 79). Secondary data was attained 
through publicly available annual reports, press releases, news articles, and looking past 
websites on www.archive.org, and was the first step of data gathering in this re-
search. Annual reports and press releases were collected from Sanoma (previously 
known as SanomaWSOY), and news articles from Ilta-Sanomat, Yle, and Markkinointi & 
Mainonta. Ilta-Sanomat is a publication of Sanoma, and its coverage on Keltainen Pörssi 
is extensive as Keltainen Pörssi has been part of the Ilta-Sanomat business unit. Whereas 
Keltainen Pörssi was founded in 1986, the timeline of interest narrowed down between 
1996 and 2016. Not only Keltainenporssi.fi was launched in 1996, but the data archives 
are also very limited to the time before that. The data was supplemented with infor-
mation from past websites of Keltainen Pörssi on www.archive.org. Objectiveness and 
data triangulation between different sources were taken into account when analyzing 
the data. Based on the collected data, a timeline of the most significant events was con-
structed (Appendix 2).  
 
3.4 Reliability and validity of the study 
Reliability and validity are standard criteria to evaluate the quality of research both in 
social sciences and business research. The classic criteria for good-quality research is 
reliability, which relates to being able to replicate the findings consistently. The second 
criteria, validity, refers to the accurateness of description or explanation of the phenom-
enon. Validity comes true when the representation of results is accurate and backed with 
evidence. (Eriksson et al., 2015: 304.) In this study, the primary data's reliability is 
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achieved with a clearly described interview process, immediate transcription of each in-
terview, and interviewee anonymity. The reliability of secondary data is achieved with 
the presentation of sources. The validity of this study emerges from the academic re-
search that the theory and used framework build upon, data triangulation of two data 




This chapter introduces the findings of this study. Firstly, a summary of secondary data 
is done. Secondly, the findings of primary data are introduced. 
 
4.1 Background of Keltainen Pörssi 
Keltainen Pörssi was firstly published in 1986. The easily-recognized and famously yellow 
magazine held a market leader position in Finnish advertising magazines, with two-thirds 
of Finnish consumers using Keltainen Pörssi. It operated in classifieds business, in which 
adverts are short and distributed into categories. The focus of it remained in trade be-
tween the consumers (C2C), even though intiatives were taken to include the sale of new 
goods (B2C). The magazine was published every Friday, and subscribers could get their 
hands on the magazine already on Thursday. It was a common sight in the magazine 
stands next to the cash counters of different stores. The tabloid-sized magazine made 
money per purchased magazine, from B2C advertising, and customers highlighting their 
adverts with different products (Table 2). Here, the lion's share of revenue came from 
issue sales as leaving an advert was free of charge for a consumer. It was published by 
Infosto Mediat, owned by Infosto Oy, before being acquired by Sanoma. 
 
Table 2. Examples of pricing for consumers.  
 
Issue 2,85 € 
Online subscription (1 month) approx. 8 € 
Creating an advert (print & online media) 0 € 
Advert first in online search results 3,90 € per week 
Advert on front page on online 49 € per week 
Red text in online advert 1,90 € per week 
 
Starting from 1996, Keltainenporssi.fi was established. Following the same logic, adverts 
were short and could be browsed based on categories. Infosto Oy itself developed elec-
tronic marketplaces onto which Keltainenporssi.fi was also built. Apparently, establishing 
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the electronic marketplace was a response to the expectation that a part of classified 
adverts was expected to move over to the internet following the increasing number of 
internet users. Additionally, classified adverts' service product development affected the 
decision. From the beginning of 1998, the use of online media went behind the paywall 
– to be able to view an advert, a monthly subscription of approximately four euros had 
to be paid. While the paywall remained as the dominant revenue model for the online 
media, leaving adverts remained free of charge, and consumers could highlight their ad-
verts with different products. Later that year, Sanoma Oy, a subsidiary of SanomaWSOY, 
acquired 35% of Infosto Oy and justified the deal with synergies both in print media and 
developing electronic marketplaces.  
  
Following the timeline, the online auction Keltainen Pörssi Huutokauppa was established 
in the online media in 1999. Later that year, the online media achieved the milestone of 
over 0,5 million users. At that time, the online media accounted for 25% of all adverts in 
Keltainen Pörssi. Investments continued when Infosto Mediat established Keltainen Tori 
in 2000, an umbrella electronic marketplace for both new and used products from dif-
ferent platforms owned by Infosto Media. Sanoma Oy acquired the rest 65% of Infosto 
Oy late 2000–early 2001 and justified it with expected growth in the electronic market-
place, synergies, the profitability of Keltainen Pörssi, and how the publishing supports 
Sanoma's existing business portfolio. At that time, the market share of Keltainen Pörssi 
was 80%, with over 300 000 readers a week. After the acquisition, Keltainen Tori and 
Keltainen Pörssi Yhteisostot services were shut down due to focus returning on the used 
goods and cooperation with SanomaWSOY. Similarly, the online auction never took off. 
Previously, the portfolio of build around the online media had been extensive as Infosto 





Figure 10. The portfolio of Keltainen Pörssi before the acquisition (from the interview 
data). 
 
In 2003 Ilta-Sanomat business unit was established, to which Keltainen Pörssi was also 
placed within Sanoma (Figure 11). The market share of Keltainen Pörssi remained at 
around 80%. In the same year, the print and online media went through a visual trans-
formation. Later, in 2005, Ilta-Sanomat Oy as a part of Sanoma purchased online auction 
service Huuto.net, which was expected to strengthen the position of Keltainen Pörssi 
and was added to the same portfolio. The online media of Keltainen Pörssi reached 100 
000 weekly users in 2006. According to one gallop, the marketplace's popularity had in-
creased by 66% in only two weeks. SanomaWSOY reorganized and established a new 
company Sanoma Digital in 2007 to enable flexible and faster product development. The 
online media of Keltainen Pörssi was added to this portfolio. Before the re-organization, 
the paywall was removed so that buyers and sellers can trade more effectively, following 





Figure 11. Organization matrix of Sanoma Oy in 2003. 
 
The magazine lost 19% of its readers during a six-month period between 2007 and 2008. 
Publisher from Sanoma put a statement that when new magazines are continuously pub-
lished, the consumption becomes more scattered, and recycling of magazines is de-
creased. To make it worse for Keltainen Pörssi, Tori.fi was launched in Finland in 2010. 
Tori.fi was the Finnish version of popular Swedish electronic marketplace Blocket.se, 
owned by Schibsted. Similarly to Keltainenporssi.fi, leaving an advert in Tori.fi could be 
done with no charge. While both medias focused on C2C trade, one of the profound 
differences lied in revenue models. While Keltainen Pörssi online media had imple-
mented a paywall for years, Tori.fi was build on advertisement-funded logic. With large 
investments to drive traffic to the platform, Schibsted managed to make Tori.fi popular 
in a short period of time (Figure 12). Similarly to Blocket.se, Schibsted has managed to 





Figure 12. Search popularity data from August 2005 to June 2016 (Google Trends). 
 
The printed version of Keltainen Pörssi was described come to the end of its life cycle 
after an employee cooperation negotiation in the Sanoma Magazines business unit in 
2012. The followed re-structuring was described to answer to the changed consumption 
of media and quickly digitalizing environment. This was then followed by a group-level 
savings program of 60 million euros between 2013 and 2015 to ensure a competitive 
cost level. Employee cooperation negotiation that also concerned the online media took 
place in Sanoma Digital Finland in 2014. The aftermath was the restructuration of the 
eCom-unit. This was followed by the shutdown of the Sanoma Digital Finland business 
unit in 2015. In mid-2016, the online media got closed down as an independent market-
place and was merged with Huuto.net. The director responsible for the Digital eCom-
business commented that digitalization resulted in Huuto.net taking its share of the mar-
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4.2 Sources of organizational inertia  
Structural inertia that emerged comprehends the continuous balancing act between 
print and online media, the inertia brought by the change of ownership in the Sanoma 
acquisition, how it affected the strategic direction, and the slow transformation process 
when it comes to a traditional organization as Ilta-Sanomat. Since the pace of digital 
transformation in the online classifieds industry was fast, the challenge was considering 
what kind of effects different efforts had in the two different channels. The inertia was 
not deliberate but could have been a cut out for Keltainen Pörssi to keep up with the 
macro-environment changes described by Hannan et al. (1984). In fact, this was consid-
ered as one of the greatest challenges: 
 
"I would consider the biggest challenge we faced was this 'cannibalism discussion' 
– how much to push online considering we had a print magazine and the size of 
revenue. The difference of the revenues was huge." (I2) 
 
Due to this, a lot of consideration was put into the decision-making, and the print and 
online media were reflected as an entity. The situation was challenging for a legacy or-
ganization: 
 
"I said that the paywall should have been killed earlier, but it is not an as simple 
thing as it would also have meant that let's kill the print magazine. Because if you 
make your online service free of charge, nobody will buy the magazine anymore." 
(I4) 
 
After the acquisition, actions were taken, and approximately 50 employees in advertise-
ment reception were trained to form a sales organization to develop a B2C advertising 
business. However, the change of ownership from a privately held company to a subsid-
iary of a multinational company had its influence on the strategy, and the direction 
where Keltainen Pörssi was headed took a significant change: many businesses under 
the Keltainen Pörssi brand were killed, and Keltainen Pörssi was placed under recently-
founded Ilta-Sanomat business unit:  
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"It was so that everything else was abandoned than the core business and the core 
business was classifieds." (I2) 
            
"There was thought of copy sales in the background. That the print magazine rev-
enue is pursued and Keltainen Pörssi as a magazine sold. Copy sales were stronger 
than subscription sales. So that sales were pursued where Ilta-Sanomat was strong, 
and it was really good in copy sales at the time." (I5) 
 
However, there were synergies in this arrangement from a print point of view, and the 
potential business units where Keltainen Pörssi could have been placed were limited 
(Figure 11). Besson et al. (2012) argued that it is easier for immature organizations to 
adopt new organizational structures enabled by the advantages of new technologies. For 
Ilta-Sanomat, who had its digitalization strategy already placed, it meant slower trans-
formation process compared to born-digitals: 
  
"Here comes the humans' limited ability and how long it takes before the process 
is finished to play. This kind of transformation process of a traditional organization 
is slow. In this sense, start-ups win because they do not have the burden to go 
through this process entirely." (I3) 
 
Many of the practices implemented in IT reminded of the best practices similar to mod-
ern agile methodologies. Most of the development was done in-house as directly imple-
mented solutions were non-existent. For example, this meant directly collaborating with 
banks to enable payment options. Besson et al. (2012) described how modularity, scala-
bility, and interoperability were the cornerstones of socio-technical inertia. However, 
due to low degree of technological development (e.g. the lack of modular solutions) and 
how it affected how the IT development was done, some inertia emerged: 
 
"A platform reform was done, that is, the old platform started to be quite old, and 
there was done all kinds of interesting stuff because general web servers and tech-
nologies had not offered all the things necessary for those web services, so there 
was some in half self-coded web server and other similarities." (I4) 
 
Despite the agility in IT development, the pace and how the development had to be car-
ried out affected negatively to scalability: 
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"And we were really agile in fact – we build them really fast, but maybe the prob-
lem was that they were built so quickly that they were not that scalable in a sense 
as everything was built quite like a bubblegum to be added." (I1) 
 
Socio-technical inertia was the least recognized type of inertia by the interviewees. Cog-
nitive inertia emerged from the defensive approach and how it affected sense, seize, and 
reconfigure capabilities. This links to findings of Laureiro-Martínez et al. (2018) and how 
deliberate decision-making should be implemented in ill-structured problems. While ad-
aptative actions were taken place under Sanoma's ownership, such as emphasis was put 
moved to B2C revenue models when free platforms started to roll out and Ilta-Sanomat 
had its digital strategy being implemented, there were signs of defensive actions despite 
changes in macro-environment were sensed: 
 
 "…they had an extremely defensive approach, that is, let's do what we have to do 
and let's give others to try and if it works, we will come with our big mass and win 
these others." (I2) 
 
 "It was in a sense a delaying battle since the number of magazine readers was 
constantly decreasing when people moved more and more to the internet, and by 
noticing that these kinds of things could more easily be done online because of the 
easiness to search and all other similar things." (I4) 
 
Three additional sources of organizational inertia were recognized, which turned out to 
play a significant role in the case. Firstly, adapting from Tripsas (2009), the identity of 
Keltainen Pörssi worked as a lens that filtered the choices that were made. This was 
mostly associated with the 'advertise for free' slogan, and how it guided the choices that 
were made: 
 
"But maybe there was a classic strategic topic – it was largely about that we had 
previously defined that in which business we operate, and we had defined that we 
operate in advertise for free business and in that case, you will find the competitors 




Identity caused inertia as the changes in the market were identity-challenging and re-
sulted in the inability to lead the transformation. For example, consumers leaving ad-
verts free of charge led to a tension compared to business customers, which caused chal-
lenges in a market in which the logic was fundamentally changing: 
 
"…and the slogan behind it [concept], advertise for free, lead to the inability to lead 
the transformation." (I3) 
 
Secondly, Vorbach, Wipfler, and Schimpf (2017) discuss the role of business model inertia 
in regard to disruptive technologies and recognize that cognitive patterns, unclear busi-
ness models for first movers, path-dependence of business model evolvement, and re-
source-based restrictions are sources are generally noted sources of business model in-
ertia in literature. The case of Keltainen Pörssi connects with the theory in different ways. 
For example, the revenue model in new digital marketplaces was not established, which 
posed challenges for first movers: 
  
"It certainly has been the point where if I again observe my own actions critically 
in the light of history, so I did not understand, and we did not understand enough 
the significance what could have been the revenue model of building these kinds 
of digital marketplaces." (I3) 
 
Originally, the paywall that was implemented online was created to imitate the revenue 
model of the print that sold extremely well. As noted above, the revenue model of copy 
sales was considered being a challenge on how to lead the transformation. This connects 
to business models as cognitive patterns and how established companies derive the logic 
from extant business models. Soon after, the industry went through a transformation 
from being funded by the consumer to funded by advertising and forced to make 
changes to revenue model as the new model was driven by a number of visitors:  
 
"We were ahead of time considering we had a paywall already back then. The re-
ality is for that kind of online service; a paywall would not have been a successful 
model since a lot of free online services came to the marketplace." (I1)  
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"But as I noted that we gave up of it [paywall] at some point due to strategic rea-
sons as we saw that we want to boost the online more. So, it was challenging, there 
was not a clear vision." (I2) 
 
The third additional source of inertia that emerged was a success trap. It surfaces from 
both the success of the paywall and the strong position Keltainen Pörssi held. Success 
traps are recognized concepts of organizational inertia that prevents organizations from 
breaking out of existing competencies in changing environments (Wang, Senaratne & 
Rafiq, 2015). Keltainen Pörssi held a market share close to monopoly and did exception-
ally well in copy sales. Later, before the aforementioned transformation in the market, 
Keltainen Pörssi had managed to commercialize the paywall online. However, success 
was not eternal and caused a dilemma of at what stage the revenue model should have 
been abandoned: 
 
"It started to look like that it [paywall] is not the winner model. We should have 
given up on it much earlier in retrospect. But there was pretty good money coming 
in… That is why we did not give up on the paywall but continued to sell read time 
as we had a really good market share in a way, or a foothold in people's minds in 
free to advertise thinking, and we had good things to advertise." (I1) 
 
"A hard spot was when the extremely strong revenue model started to become 
dysfunctional, and you saw and understood that you are driving to a wall and fast. 
Of course, the timeline got probably distorted for us inside, but it was a money-
making machine for a long time that people actually paid for as the content was 
so rich and good, and people were ready to pay for it, no doubt. So, when you have 
a thing that produces well but there are signs in the air that this will not continue 
for a lifetime, so at which stage you kill the money-making machine in a sense and 
pursue better revenue and start re-building it." (I4)  
 
However, the situation was made more difficult when cash flows from the print had to 
be taken into account. This resulted in a structural problem, where the incoming cash 




4.3 Organizational inertia and the success of digital transformation 
The portfolio of products built around Keltainen Pörssi was diverse, and this was enabled 
by the extremely well-selling print. Investments to online allowed Keltainen Pörssi to tar-
get new demographics. Whereas Sanoma coming along with a minority share in Infosto 
Media, was considered to boost the mentality, the full acquisition had a different effect. 
In general, this can be described as a loss of autonomy since the strategic direction 
changed, and Keltainen Pörssi had to adapt to Sanoma's existing portfolio. For example, 
the investments became more carefully calculated, and the agility of the team was af-
fected: 
  
“There I saw as a problem that the business and revenue of Keltainen Pörssi com-
pared to other accounts Ilta-Sanomat and Helsingin Sanomat was so small so that 
the resourcing was also small. Maybe then Keltainen Pörssi online media did not 
necessarily get – or then it started to show whether you can invest or not, and that 
kind of autonomy was lost.” (I5) 
 
“And then Sanoma strongly emphasized as a strategy that there must be concen-
trated platforms and brand uniformity must exist. There everyone had to go in the 
same direction simultaneously so that the agility was lost.” (I5) 
 
Sanoma had experience of B2C from Oikotie, which was placed under Helsingin Sanomat. 
However, C2C was the more robust area for Keltainen Pörssi. Many businesses outside 
the classifieds were abandoned, as mentioned earlier. Additionally, some projects were 
halted per the new owner's vision. This relates to both structural and cognitive inertia – 
to divesting businesses and Sanoma holding a defensive approach: 
 
“That process [developing search features in online media further] we then kicked 
off, and it was under development, but then when the new owner came along, we 
had quite different views about the development plan. I pushed it forward like crazy, 
but the new owner said no.” (I2) 
 
The strong brand of Keltainen Pörssi centered around jacks of all trades who tried to find 
the best deals from the newest advertisements. The cheapness associated with the 
brand and the slogan of 'advertise for free' were seen as the corner stones of identity 
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that resulted in concept impoverishment. Whereas Tripsas (2009) approached identity 
from how the technology challenges it, for Keltainen Pörssi this concerned its concept 
more extensively: 
  
“First of all, we struck against this auction concept so that in principle, the concept 
impoverishment has been the fundamental mistake or question we were not able 
to solve. For Keltainen Pörssi, it was 'advertise for free', for Huuto.net it was the 
auction process, and it allowed Tori to enter the market. Which has managed to 
win Huuto.net.” (I3) 
 
However, Keltainen Pörssi had tools along with the Palsta acquisition when it comes to 
concept renewal. For example, Palsta, the main competitor for Keltainen Pörssi, had dif-
ferent verticals built around it at the time it was acquired by Keltainen Pörssi. Always 
being smaller than Keltainen Pörssi, Palsta was shut down at some stage. B2C verticals 
ended up taking the market space: 
 
“And the money has ultimately being made in those B2C verticals – it has been the 
winning concept in this area in Finland which ended up being the concept built 
around Nettix. It was the one which won this consumer market.” (I3) 
  
The successful copy sales model of Keltainen Pörssi was transformed into a 'read time' 
model, a paywall that successfully took off in its online media. Its success resulted in 
Keltainen Pörssi holding on to it, which rebounded on Keltainen Pörssi when the industry 
started to shift towards being funded by advertisements. The business model depreci-
ated since the ones who benefited from this were those who managed to drive as much 
traffic to the platform as possible, which meant free platforms in this case. The effect got 
stronger because the lost traffic affected the pricing of this new revenue model: 
  
“Because we drained the number of visitors with it [paywall], we opened a possi-
bility for competitors to enter the market, and the draining of the number of visitors 
affected the pricing of B2C advertisements.” (I4) 
 
Despite Keltainen Pörssi being first in the online classifieds market, the newcomers were 
able to start from the same line following the changed market conditions: 
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“…then the understanding came that the paywall or 'advertise for free' business 
model is not enough, but you will have to build those B2B revenue models and B2C 
advertisement models subject to charge. As the other competitors started to build.” 
(I1) 
  
Ultimately, holding on to the paywall realized in lost marketspace in addition to affecting 
the pricing of B2C advertisements. Here it meant that free platforms managed to drive 
traffic to their platforms with large investments. For example, Schibsted, with its large 
investments in Tori.fi, allowed rapid growth and benefited from the situation: 
  
“…then Tori and this kind of free platforms were able to grow, and we acknowl-
edged too late in a way that the paywall was bad since we had not grown in visitors 
because we were behind the paywall whereas the competitor had grown as they 
were free for users.” (I1) 
 
At the same time, Keltainen Pörssi competed in C2C business with Huuto.net that was 
free in both ways. Additionally, Nettix managed to succeed with its verticals in segments 
important for Keltainen Pörssi pushed by the shift in revenue models: 
 
“What was the main competitor back at that stage was obviously Huuto.net which 
was the one that gained [marketspace] in C2C business had a couple of reasons: 
first of all, it was free in both ways, and the second that auction was maybe exciting 
in some way, we had not managed to get our auction so big and strong at that 
stage. Then Nettix was, of course, strong in our strong segments – cars, boats, 
camper vans, and motorcycles and in a way, they were able to drive that consumer 
traffic and present it that 'as this is free for our readers you will get eyes with this' 
and managed to get a foothold from there.” (I4) 
 
Sanoma Media Finland, a subsidiary of Sanoma Digital sold Huuto.net to ePrice Oy in 
2019. Alma Media, one of the biggest media groups in Finland and a competitor of 
Sanoma, recently announced the acquisition of Nettix with 170 million euros. While 
Alma Media invests in marketplaces with great results, Sanoma has continued to invest 
in teaching materials. (Mikrobitti, 2019; Talouselämä, 2021.) 
 
59 
4.4 How to overcome organizational inertia 
Interviewees were not directly asked how organizational inertia can be overcome. How-
ever, the goal was to collect any areas of improvement that the interviewees recognized 
to understand better how the different types of organizational inertia can be overcome. 
Firstly, structural inertia was linked to incorrect placement: 
 
"And the decision went so that we were slapped the Keltainen Pörssi under Ilta-
Sanomat. And the idea was the biggest common driver is copy sales. And this is a 
totally wrong way of thinking. Keltainen Pörssi was not a copy sales business. It 
was a classifieds business. And you had to understand the conformity to law." (I2) 
 
As mentioned earlier, Sanoma was limited by its current portfolio where Keltainen Pörssi 
could have been placed. However, it was not until 2007 when the online media was 
placed under Sanoma Digital, abandoning the paywall simultaneously. Here, the correct 
placement is associated with understanding the business concept and positioning it ac-
cordingly. Taking into account how identity was connected concept impoverishment, a 
burden caused by the slogan, it appears that identity also connects to understanding the 
business concept and correct positioning:  
 
"And then I remember that in the strategy work, the big realization in a way, which 
sounds ridiculous in retrospect, was that we are in fact in classifieds business. That 
we defined it differently in a way, which sounds funny in retrospect, that what the 
competitive field is." (I1) 
 
Considering that most IT development was down by its own developers and how the 
online media was able to create value, an interesting perspective would have been to go 
even further when it comes to positioning. For example, comparing to the sources of 
value creation by Amit and Zott (2001), the study conducted at the time of the dot-com 
bubble burst in 2001 supports profiling Keltainen Pörssi as a technology company. How-
ever, such thinking did not mentality did not prevail at the time: 
 
"Maybe the other thing understood long later on is that we should have considered 
ourselves are a technology company by it was not so mainstream thinking at the 
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time as it is today. Really many of the firms that do some consumer service or B2B 
service even more think themselves as a technology company because that is 
where the competitive advantage is born." (I1) 
 
Business model inertia and inertia caused by the success trap were associated with re-
configuring capabilities. The changes in the industry were sensed and new business 
models became existent, but Keltainen Pörssi was slow to reconfigure due to extant rev-
enue model and its success. This meant holding on to a revenue model that was seen to 
come to its end. Paywall can be seen to opposite logic to the new requirements where 
maximal traffic is one of the important values creating factors. This does not mean that 
the paywall as a revenue model was insufficient but rather not reconfiguring the existing 
assets as the market changed: 
 
"In order to get B2B advertisements subject to a charge, you must drive enough 
traffic." (I4) 
 
"If you advertise for free, read for free, and you managed to avoid [from becoming 
tangled] to how the business is done, the question is what remains. Maybe you can 
advertise something, but it would have been quite a poor return if we had built 
around the being funded by advertisements." (I3) 
 
Wang et al. (2015) argued that not being trap in your own success is extremely important 
in regard to strategic renewal in the light of environmental change. If reconfigured earlier, 
there would have remained a possibility to remain competitive: 
 
"It would have been a tough race even though the technology would have been in 
order in a sense and would have abandoned the paywall early enough, so it would 
have been an extremely tough race. After all, Sanoma did not manage in it with 
Oikotie or Huuto.net in a way." (I1) 
 
Firms that are able to avoid success traps, and have better capabilities absorb and trans-
form are likely to develop and apply dynamic capabilities better than competitors (Wang 
et al. (2015). For Keltainen Pörssi, the success trap links to reconfiguring capabilities as 
the market changes were sensed. 
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5 Conclusions 
Keltainen Pörssi went through significant changes through this study's interest period, 
both on micro and macro levels. Most of all, change of ownership and the early industry 
life cycle posed challenges for a business with a great legacy. Its digital transformation 
was self-initiated and started successfully. After the dot-com bubble busted and the new 
owner took over, the path of development changed. This was followed by several indus-
try-wide disruptions enabled by rapid technological developments, which posed oppor-
tunities for newcomers. Having started its digital transformation successfully, Keltainen 
Pörssi had a hard time keeping up with the fast-paced industry. After abandoning the 
print in 2012, this was followed later by the shutdown of online media. 
  
5.1 Summary and discussion 
The literature review of this study was started by defining digital transformation. It was 
noted that current definitions call for more generic definitions since the boundaries of 
digital transformation are not equally unambiguous as many studies state. This was 
linked to the overall incompleteness of many definitions of digital transformations. It was 
also presented how organizational inertia affects new value creation paths enabled by 
the digital transformation. Then, dynamic capabilities and their organizational micro-
foundations were discussed to build the gap between individual considerations and a 
more common capability view. As it was observed, dynamic capabilities research itself 
does not make clear connections to micro-level considerations, but the bridges have to 
be built. As a result, routines, motivations, and social networks were discussed. Lastly, 
three types of organizational inertia, structural, socio-technical, and cognitive inertia, 
were defined to provide a basis for exploring the emergence of inertia in the case. On 
top of these, additional sources of inertia were recognized after an empirical observation 
(Table 3).  
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Table 3. Recognized types of organizational inertia. 
 
Type of inertia How it realized 
Structural inertia Balancing act between print and online media, placement within the 
new organization and the divestments followed by this, alignment 
within the new organization 
 
Socio-technical inertia Unscalabity, lack of modular solutions 
 
Cognitive inertia Defensive approach to macro-level changes 
 
Identity Slogan ‘advertise for free’ and inability to lead the transformation out-
side of it 
 
Business model inertia Non-existent business models in a new market, how new business 
model was derived from the existent one 
 
Success trap Successful business model (paywall) and strong position lead hang-
ing on the revenue model in changing market which drained traffic 
and allowed new competitors to enter 
 
 
The first research question concerned the sources of organizational inertia (Figure 13). 
The three types of organizational inertia that were theoretically reviewed were struc-
tural, socio-technical, and cognitive inertia. After confronting the theory with the case, 
three additional sources of inertia were recognized. Structural inertia emerged from the 
balancing act between print and online media, change in the strategic direction after the 
acquisition, and the slow transformation process of Ilta-Sanomat. The inertia was not 
deliberate and was a consequence of a selection process (Hannan et al., 1984; Schwarz, 
2012). It was partially explained by inflexible structures and how that reflected as slow-
ness to adjust to a fast-changing environment (Hannan et al., 1984; Verhoef et al., 2019). 
Socio-technical inertia was linked to a low degree of technological development and how 
this affected how the development was carried out. These findings align with the find-
ings of Besson et al. (2012) by pointing the role of old technologies as the source of 
inertia. Cognitive inertia emerged from the Sanoma's defensive approach towards 
macro-level changes. The self-confident approach resonates with the findings of Lau-
reiro-Martínez et al. (2018) that suggest less-deliberate decision-making as the source 





Figure 13. The sources of organizational inertia. 
 
Identity was recognized as a source of inertia, culminating in the slogan "we are an ad-
vertise for free business". Here, a slogan and a concept caused tensions to changes in 
the environment. Business model inertia concerned unclear business models for first 
movers in the online classifieds industry, which realized as a cognitive pattern where new 
revenue model was derived from the dominant logic of extant copy sales revenue model. 
Similar business model inertia is an acknowledged problem of technology swifts and rad-
ical technological change (Vorbach et al., 2017). Lastly, inertia developed from a success 
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trap of the paywall that caused being left behind in the shifting industry. Whereas past 
success is not a proxy for success traps, it was realized for Keltainen Pörssi as it prevented 
it from breaking out from exploiting current competencies when the market had already 
started to change (Wang et al., 2015). 
 
The second research question dealt with how the organizational inertia affected the dig-
ital transformation's success (Figure 14). Loss of autonomy was recognized being a result 
of the changed ownership and alignment in the new organization. Allowing teams to self-
organize and grassroots level empowerment endorse agility (Dikert et al., 2016), in which 
Keltainen Pörssi had previously excelled. Concept impoverishment resulted from inertia 
caused by the identity and how it ensued to the inability to lead the transformation. This 
was not deliberate, as in the case of Kodak (Lucas et al., 2009), but the management 
could not solve challenges regarding it. For example, doubts emerged during an inter-






Figure 14. The outcomes of organizational inertia. 
 
Unscalability was a recognized outcome of socio-technical inertia, which understood 
how the technological development was done at the time. Divestments resulted from 
structural inertia, i.e. how the non-core businesses were abandoned, and cognitive iner-
tia caused by the defensive approach. The reasoning remained somewhat unclear but 
may be linked to Keltainen Pörssi's strong copy sales and the perception built around it. 
Business model depreciation was caused by the business model's inertia and success 
trap, which appeared as hanging on to the extant revenue model and the consequences 
it had when moving to a new revenue model. In other words, the paywall diminished 
traffic, which was to become the dominant logic of new revenue models. Similarly, this 




The third research question focused on how the recognized types of organizational in-
ertia can be overcome. Three themes applicable to this case were observed (Figure 15). 
First relates to understanding the business concept and how it filters the actions. For 
Keltainen Pörssi, it meant that the concept should have been approached more as a clas-
sifieds business and how it could have decreased the structural inertia. This relates 
closely to the second theme, correct positioning, which is two-sided. It connects to struc-
tural inertia from the correct placement in the organization that would endorse an agile 
way of working. This is important for rapid learning and experimentation with digital 
solutions (Smith et al., 2020). On the other hand, this relates to how the business is po-
sitioned in the market. It emerged from the interviewees that all did not share the com-
mon understanding of the position of Keltainen Pörssi at the time. In digital markets, 





Figure 15. Overcoming organizational inertia. 
 
The last theme that emerged was reconfiguring capabilities. This connects to business 
model inertia and success trap and leaves an opening to whether Keltainen Pörssi could 
have succeeded in the classifieds industry. Firstly, this connects to the extant revenue 
model and how incumbents remain constrained to find new value creation methods 
(Vorbach et al., 2017). As the revenue model changed, Keltainen Pörssi should have been 
able to reconfigure more efficiently to drive more traffic and gain a foothold in the chang-
ing market. Secondly, success traps negatively affect transformative capabilities, and suc-
cess traps are a crucial part of responding to environmental change (Wang et al., 2015). 
Due to the late actions Keltainen Pörssi took, this resulted in harming their own business 
and losing market space. 
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5.2 Theoretical implications 
The goal of this study was to confront a case of digital transformation with an organiza-
tional inertia perspective. With a focus on an incumbent business, six different types of 
organizational inertia were recognized. This study successfully built the gap between 
management and information systems literature by recognizing several types of inertia 
in a single case study that are emphasized differently in these two research areas. While 
this study's findings cannot be generalized, it builds knowledge on more well-known and 
recently recognized types of inertia and how they play together. As a result, this study 
builds the foundation for future research on how different types of organizations can be 
overcome and address such aspirations' complexity. 
  
This study also sheds light on dynamic capabilities and their microfoundations. While 
changes in market were sensed, processing those changes was moderated by organiza-
tional inertia and resulted in not taking immeadiate actions to reconfigure existing assets. 
On a more detail level, more knowledge was gained of dynamic capabilities in respect to 
emergence of success trap and business model inertia while clear connections to their 
microfoundations remain somewhat open. The connection between cognitive patterns 
and cognitive inertia was made through this case, which highlighted cognitive flexibility 
and how decision-making processes should be adjusted per situation (Laureiro-Martínez 
et al., 2018). As a result, future research could focus on deepening understanding of the 
microfoundations of these three sources of inertia.  
  
While this study's approach was employee-level adoption, it did not play a role in this 
transformation. Quite the opposite, several connections were made to industry-wide 
transformation and what kind of effects this had on Keltainen Pörssi. Drawing from the 
study of Lanamäki et al. (2020) and Vial's (2019) review, this study suggests further ex-
ploration of digital transformation definitions. Correspondingly to the study of Lanamäki 
al. (2020), the digital transformation of Keltainen Pörssi was not always driven by inten-
tionality, or the intention-outcome relationship was not always clear. Whereas digital 
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transformation is often seen as a self-initiated process, the dot-com bubble, digital trans-
formation of the entire media industry, and changes in global networks had their influ-
ence on Keltainen Pörssi. This calls for more focus put on the relational model proposed 
by Lanamäki et al. (2020). 
 
5.3 Managerial implications 
This study develops an understanding of the causes of organizational inertia through a 
real-life business case. The findings suggest how managers need to recognize the sources 
of organizational inertia to lead an organization's transformation in a changing environ-
ment. Whereas the concept of inertia is often associated with the objective to keep the 
status quo, the findings suggest that the inertia is not deliberate more often. As a result, 
this builds the understanding of the difficulty to recognize sources of inertia for manag-
ers to overcome their effect. Additionally, the findings show how several types of inertia 
can simultaneously occur, highlighting managers' capability to lead the transformation 
in a complex environment where several types of inertia may have a combined negative 
effect. 
  
The study also builds knowledge about the potential outcomes of organizational inertia. 
Recognizing the outcomes helps managers to make connections to the sources of inertia 
and to overcome them. Although, the outcomes may vary a lot per context. The associ-
ations between types of inertia and their outcomes were not equally clear compared to 
their sources, which points to the overlapping effects of different types of inertia and 
demonstrates how managers may find it challenging to track inertia sources with a bot-
tom-up approach. Whereas this was not the main focus of this study, it builds managers' 
knowledge on how significant the outcomes of inertia may become, which was realized 
as lost marketspace and concept impoverishment in this case. 
  
The study contributed by providing managers insight into how many recognized types of 
organizational inertia can be overcome. In this case, the means culminated between un-
derstanding the concept and positioning it accordingly, and how changing environment 
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links to reconfiguring capabilities. This helps managers connect between recognized 
types of inertia and how their effects can be diminished with the recognized counterbal-
ancing factors. Additionally, the study builds managers' understanding of dynamic capa-
bilities' role as counterbalancing factors of inertia in changing environment. A good ex-
ample of this was when the changes in the environment were sensed, and a new revenue 
model became existent, but it took time for Keltainen Pörssi to reconfigure its assets. 
 
Looking back at how the recognized types of inertia realized, areas of improvement can 
be found. Even though synergies existed when placing Keltainen Pörssi under the Ilta-
Sanomat business unit, a different arrangement can be rationalized. While the decision 
was driven by the issue sales logic and lack of other alternatives, this harmed the online 
media, which had previously implemented new features in an agile and autonomous way 
in a fast-changing environment. To keep synergies between print and existing portfolio, 
placing the online media in a separate unit can be justified. Additionally, the overly self-
confident and defensive approach to macro-level changes could have been turned into 
a competitive advantage if the market change had been seen as an opportunity rather 
than as a tardy change approaching the market.  
 
The slogan 'advertise for free' and how it was drilled down to the concept of Keltainen 
Pörssi links to the business model inertia, and how Keltainen Pörssi suffered from having 
existing business models in the market. To overcome this, Keltainen Pörssi would have 
needed a business model where advertising was either free or subject to charge whether 
the advertiser was a consumer or a business. Looking back at how the market developed, 
moving earlier to the advertisement-funded revenue logic would have supported this. 
While it can be argued that building the business model build on top of this logic would 
not have been profitable in the beginning, it ended up causing a success trap which ulti-
mately led Keltainen Pörssi to lose market space. Moving earlier to advertisement-
funded revenue model would have supported the traffic-driven business logic, which 
ended up playing a major role in new electronic marketplaces. 
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Appendix 1. Research questions 
Background Please describe your role and responsibilities 
Which were the most signigicant events during your time working with Kel-
tainen Pörssi or Keltainenporssi.fi? 




Which were the major challenges? 
In which did you succeed? 
How the commercialization of online media succeeded? 
What kind of return was received from investments? 
How investments to online media were justified considering the non-ex-
istancy of similar services? 





How the increased use of internet affected the customer processes related 
to advertising papers (both B2B and B2C)? 
What challanges related to copying a successful revenue model? 
How strong did these two businesses (print and online media) affected on 
one to another? 
What pros and cons related to implementing an internet-based business 
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